Research Overview

My research on regulatory politics examines how interest groups and the presidency shape regulatory outcomes through the administrative state. While legislative lobbying receives substantial attention, my work reveals the critical but understudied role of lobbying during regulatory review at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget. Through analysis of over 1,500 regulations, I demonstrate that interest group lobbying during OIRA review can be highly influential, especially when there is consensus across groups. This work has opened a new frontier in understanding how organized interests adapt their strategies to influence policy implementation after legislation has passed.

A central focus of my research investigates regulatory policymaking tools beyond traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking. Agency guidance documents—which have become the policy tool of choice in areas like food and drug regulation—represent a largely unexplored dimension of the regulatory state. My work examines how agencies use these "quasi-rulemaking" instruments and how they differ from formal regulations in their development, implementation, and susceptibility to lobbying. I have also documented how presidential administrations use regulatory review strategically, sometimes as a partisan tool to advance policy goals and sometimes as a moderating influence on agency actions, revealing the nuanced role of political oversight in administrative policymaking.

My research extends to specific regulatory domains, including comprehensive analysis of Affordable Care Act implementation through rulemaking and a historical examination of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's evolving role in public health regulation. The FDA research traces how law and science have interacted throughout the agency's history, examines its drug and vaccine approval processes, and assesses unprecedented challenges from declining institutional trust, political polarization, and the COVID-19 pandemic. This work also investigates regulatory timing—the factors that influence how long agencies take to complete rulemakings—revealing how political, institutional, and technical considerations interact to shape the pace of regulatory policymaking. Collectively, this research contributes to broader debates about executive power, administrative capacity, democratic accountability, and the relationship between science and politics in the modern regulatory state.